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THE FUNCTIONS OF LAW
IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY
By MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY*
The life of the law, Mr. Justice Holmes observed, at the beginning of
the twentieth century, has not been logic, but experience.' Although the
statement has been quoted many times, it still seems to come as something
of a surprise even to well-informed people. Perhaps he might have pre-
sented an equally arresting challenge if he had also pointed out something
similar about analogies. Although the search for similar cases has consti-
tuted the unique method for the advancement of the common law since
Bracton's time,-"let them be decided like a similar case," was the latter's
recommendation for securing justice in the courts 2-the so-called rule of
thumb, which became pervasive as the established principle of stare de-
cisis, tended to dominate the system on the local level with foreclosing
rigidity. If a precedent could not be found, the conclusion of "no remedy"
quickly followed, no matter how justifiable a complaint appeared to be.
Today, much of the time spent on "research" in the practice of law
has been used up in trying to locate a case "on all fours" with the set of
facts currently in issue. Happiness comes to the plaintiff who is successful
in his search. Frustration is the lot of a defendant who is unable to find
even an infinitesimal difference in the fact situation upon which to distin-
guish the cases. The accepted adversary procedure yields decisions based
upon verbal battles over interpreting previous judicial opinions and their
application to similar sets of facts. The vast area of human activities which
cannot be squeezed to fit within this ancient edifice are carried on quite
outside the law. To the extent that day by day experience has been over-
looked and logic has prevailed instead within the legal order, the steady
erosion of life from law was continued until the crisis stage has about been
reached.
The separation of law from life has become perhaps even more obvious
on the international level than in local affairs. This may be inferred from
*Representative at the United Nations for World Peace Through Law; Member of the
District of Columbia and New Jersey Bais.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1946).
2 H. DE BRAcrON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSuETunin~us ANGLE (S. Thorne transl. 1968).
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the appearance of the first serious study of Analogies in the Law' by Hersch
Lauterpacht, afterwards British Judge on the World Court, which was
centered in the internationafllaw field. In this connection it is worthy of
note that Justice Lauterpacht's second book was entitled The Function of
Law in the International Community.4 It may not be entirely without
significance that C.K. Ogden's translation of Vaihinger's Philosophy of 'As
If, '5 was published at about the same time as Lauterpacht's innovative
work. Before then, apprentice training for the practice of law had adapted
the prevailing pedagogical system involving the transmission of concepts,
or, rather, of principles in the law, often, it is feared, in a rather mechanical
manner.
The break away from assumptions, presumptions, concepts, and ana-
logical thinking, which had constituted learning in the law during earlier
centuries, began to take shape at the beginning of the twentieth century,
when a call for more realism in the law began to be heard. Not only Mr.
Justice Holmes, but also Mr. Justice Brandeis, both subsequently partners
in drafting dissenting opinions on the United States Supreme Court bench,
insisted repeatedly on the need for facts and ever more facts. With his early
experience as professor of the law of evidence to build on, Louis Brandeis
was in a position to take a strong stand for first-hand testimony and
against hearsay, or the reporting of events through the eyes and interpre-
tive mind of third persons. The way was opened again for parallel advance
of law with science and technology.
On the European continent a comparable turning away from artful
constructs and unexamined assumptions was being recorded in the publi-
cations of the pioneer group of jurists and law professors in France who
have come to be known as The French Institutionalists, principally Maur-
ice Hauriou, Georges Renard, and Joseph Delos.' In between, not pro-
fessedly as advocate for the Institutionalist theory, but stimulated by the
tendency to shift closer toward the actualities observable in life than had
lately been customary in the legal system, Francois Geny's pioneering work
found an appreciative response with Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, also
to be appointed later to the United States Supreme Court, who presented
aspects of the new perspective to sympathetic colleagues.
7
The road ahead did not permit a steady advance, however, but in-
3 H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927) (with
special reference to International Arbitration).
4H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'As IF' (C. Ogden transl. 1925).
THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS: MAURICE HAuRIou, GEORGES RENARD, JOSEPH T. DELOS XXV,
370 (A. Broderick ed., M. Welling transl. 1970).
1 B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 627 (1921), citing F. GENY, MtTHODE
D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIV# PosrrI (rev. ed. 1932) (J. Mayda transl. 1963),
and F. GENY, SIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF (1914-1930) (4 volumes).
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stead, was marked out in a rather zig-zagged pattern, particularly check-
ered in domestic circles. Two World Wars appear to have done more to turn
human artifices into shambles with impending speed than even far-seeing
seekers of light might have thought possible. The latter half of the twen-
tieth century found the intellectual struggles of the law thereafter trans-
ported to the world stage.
Although there seems to have been little direct interchange or borrow-
ing between law and philosophy in modem times, both appear to have
followed parallel courses into the snares of abstraction, only now turning
attention towards the roots in the hope of finding the causes of the unheal-
thy plants grown up in the absence of skilled cultivation. It might be
inferred from the great number of comments published, many of them
critical, involving the names of men like Descartes, Hobbes, Kant and
Hegel, Bentham and Austin, that their dominant influence has started to
decline. Is there anything left to say about their speculations which can
amount to a real contribution toward the solving of contemporary prob-
lems? Quite the contrary, it would seem in substance that they had led
those that followed them on wide detours from life as it is lived.
The fallacies perpetrated in the name of logic, and of analogic, would
seem to demand profound reexamination and correction. By way of sug-
gesting alternatives, there have been offered in succession insights denomi-
nated Mechanicism, Behaviorism, Biologism, Existentialism, Phenomen-
ology, and Structuralism, as well as the age-old pacifiers that can still be
drawn, in neo-forms, out of Materialism, Positivism, Idealism, Concep-
tualism, and Realism. A book should perhaps be written clarifying the
influence, often mixed or otherwise confused, which can be discerned in
various juridical trends. For this paper it is preferable, if possible, to avoid
becoming bogged down in such a dark thicket.
While acknowledging that a considerable degree of selectivity is inevi-
table, which may not win universal support from people with different
experiences to draw upon, the premises adopted here are admittedly allied
with realism, especially that based upon first-hand observation, which has
been associated traditionally with Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and
Francisco de Vitoria, but not necessarily with their professed advocates or
commentators. Actualities, especially in the International Law field, seem
to require reexamination in considerable detail. Perceptivity is recognized
as the first avenue of light. Not abstractions but concrete facts; not hearsay
but direct reporting of events or patterns that may be seen, heard, tasted,
or felt; not concepts but percepts, constitute the data, or "givens", of
experience, with which the law of the future is called upon to deal. Of
course it is not possible, nor desirable, to deny that abstractions necessarily
continue to exist. The image of a table that takes shape on the retina of
the eye is already an abstraction, since the table itself cannot physically
be admitted to that limited space. The purpose here is not to reject every
vestige of wisdom accumulated during the entire history of the human
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race, but rather to become more keenly aware of the subtle fallacies that
have multiplied undetected in the form taken by the legal order, and to
reexamine the functioning, with an eye for both gaps and worn-out parts,
in order to get the model back on the road humming smoothly on route to
its acknowledged goals. Were the philosophy more adequate, doubtless the
law would be more satisfactory; perhaps the opposite is no less true.
On the international level it is no longer necessary to advance timidly
step by step. Ever since Sputnik showed the way in 1957, there has been
no further need for relying on unproved assumptions in the international
relations field. The astronauts have given first-hand testimony that the
world is a unity in form,-if not yet in agreement on the goals for its
juridicial order. There are, however, tremendous changes going on at the
top, and the rate of change no longer lags but runs. There is an eager sense
of creativity being manifest, with proposals as likely to come from the
ministates as from those with established reputations as responsible pow-
ers of long experience. It is not necessary to generalize. Specific examples
are already numerous. Perhaps the most significant is the way the law is
now functioning at the United Nations itself.
History has been telling us that a new legal order can be dated from
the 4th of July 1776, when the Declaration of Independence was pro-
claimed in what had hitherto been colonial territory. Although the force
of arms did appear in consequence, it was not so much the military engage-
ments as the juridical appeal to persuasion on the part of the Signers which
above all distinguishes the Declaration as momentous in the progress of the
law. Here was the art of advocacy presented in its most effective style.
Following shortly after, theory took shape in the form of a written constitu-
tonal document, with checks and balances artfully invented to account for
the three functions of government, legislative, executive, and judicial,
which were then thought to be all embracing, in a workable plan for coop-
eration between independent states. Soon the Declaration form was copied
and adapted elsewhere, to explain desired goals for a different, non-
colonial Revolution, addressed more specifically to ensure governmental
guarantees, protecting the rights of man, and of citizens. From that time
on, at more or less irregular intervals, the Declaration form has been put
to use whenever a direct appeal to reason has been felt essential on govern-
mental heights. Written constitutions have also multiplied, even more
frequently. The functions differ, but the models that have taken shape
either as Declarations or as Constitutions, have suffered no diminution of
respect as legal documents through the years, regardless of the exclusive-
ness of the authority claimed for judge-made law in the common law sys-
tem.
The significance of these eighteenth century innovations in the gover-
nance of new nation-states becomes clearer in the twentieth, with the
planning of the framework for a United Nations entity. Although the Dec-
laration of Independence has not yet been acknowledged as a preamble,
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de facto or de jure, for the United States Constitution, the two documents
are usually published together, suggesting to interpreters that the meaning
of one may be made clearer if read in context with the other. It was the
model provided by the Constitution which was close at hand when the time
came for drafting the United Nations Charter, the League's basic docu-
ment having been abandoned as inadequate to provide the broader base
desired to sustain a less fragile structure. The surprising thing is not that
the Constitution was looked to as a model, but that the framework ulti-
mately adopted was so different in details. The theory basic in the United
States Constitution has no counterpart in the United Nations Charter. The
General Assembly is not at all a legislature for the world. Instead, it pro-
vides for Independence as well as Interdependence. The Secretariat is not
a check upon the General Assembly, but its servant and helper. What
check there is in the Security Council is limited in jurisdiction and in size.
The complexities of procedure, and the recognition of the right of equal
opportunity for the expression of views and experiences, has permitted a
degree of progress in juridical ideas which leaves the checks and balances
theory quite a distance behind-in the eighteenth century, in fact. The
comparison between the two documents is most striking with respect to the
judicial arm. The Court has certain functions with reference to the Charter
and its interpretation, but it is not at all the Court of last and definitive
resort that the United States Supreme Court has become. In other words,
power is acknowledged quite consciously in the Charter, but it is divided
up in functional rather than in theoretical ways, sometimes to such an
extent that little actual power is left, and at other times rather formidable
concentrations of power seem to dissolve without fearsome effect. Exactly
how the Charter of the United Nations functions in regulating States ra-
tionally is surely deserving of skilled theoretical analysis, but it must not
be undertaken on the basis of preconceptions. It is its perceptive integrity,
like that with which Outer Space has been viewed, from Copernicus to
Galileo to Einstein, that holds much promise, if the legal order may pro-
perly be compared with a compass, as well as a balance or scale.
Fresh observation of recent developments on the international level
suggests that it is the Declaration form rather than the more rigid Consti-
tutional structure which is taking on greater importance. What is at stake
here is freedom in expression and in the clarification of meaning. Just
trying to state one's position succinctly-the legal draftman's job-for the
record, helps. From the standpoint of advocacy, the Declaration is much
more persuasive, especially when supported by multilateral adoption, than
an ex parte argument presented before the World Court could possibly be.
Furthermore, the lack of forcible implementation that ordinarily accompa-
nies a Declaration, which is usually held to be a sign of weakness, com-
pared to the obligatory nature of a treaty, which is clothed with the so-
called force of law in the event of its breach, is in fact the key to the
widespread appeal which Declarations attract. Persuasion, not force,
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seems at last coming to be recognized as the preferable implementation for
the legal order directed by, to, and for, human beings.
There is another feature of Declarations which suggests much wider
appeal than that accorded judicial decisions as evidence of the law. The
Declaration functions above all in an interpretive capacity; whether it be
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the Declaration of Philadel-
phia of the ILO, or the more recent Declaration of Friendly Relations
Between States, which may be selected as an example, a Declaration
which is adopted unanimously, without dissenting vote by any Delegate
authorized to participate, necessarily claims wider adherence from the
great numbers of people whom the Delegates were empowered to represent.
Not only greater weight accompanies a Declaration but also it carries more
human appeal than any court decision does, since the latter is primarily a
ruling in a single case, which has force and effect limited to the parties
officially involved in adversary proceedings. It is only by analogy that a
decision rendered in one case is permitted to function as a general rule,
applicable to all similar fact situations. The question is being asked now
with increasing frequency whether the United States Supreme Court has
in fact jurisdiction under the Constitution to establish a rule for persons
who were not adversary parties of record, who were not heard on evidence
of the facts at issue, or on the legal issue, or on the applicable law, and
who indeed had no right to intervene in the formulation of the decision
under the rules which the Court itself has established. There was a time
when taxation without representation in the legislative organ that enacted
the tax was a grave issue. This was precisely the situation in 1776 which
gave rise to the Declaration of Independence. Today a parallel, if not an
analogous situation seems to exist when a Supreme Court rule in a single
case is extended by analogy into a universal law, without legislative inter-
vention of any kind. Even treaties recognized as the supreme law of the
land under the Constitution when ratified by the Senate have not been
considered self-executing, but require implementing legislation by the
Congress, bearing also the signature of the Executive. With respect to the
functioning of the Supreme Court decisions, however, the theoretical de-
vice of checks and balances does not seem to be functioning any more
according to plan. Not only has the analogy of stating the law as applied
in a similar case led so far astray as to amount to a denial of justice in
situations that have arisen among different parties, but the effect on ad-
ministration has been an increasingly burdensome appellate calendar,
made up of cases which often vary very little on the facts or issues from
cases previously decided which are said to establish the applicable rule.
Perhaps if Mr. Justice Holmes were to rephrase his observation to fit
today's situation, he might say, the life of the law does not owe anything
to analogy; it depends instead on interpretation. Its power derives from its
persuasive appeal, that is, upon intellect and judgment, and not on force
and will, as Kant, and perhaps Suarez, would have us believe.
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The Declaration form would appear to function even more satisfacto-
rily as an instrument of interpretation on the international level than on
the national. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the International
Court of Justice is not accustomed to rely on analogy to extend its interpre-
tation of the Charter, although trying to remain consistent. Furthermore,
its rules are designed to provide that all parties in interest can be heard in
argument before a decision is reached. In view of these specific limitations
on the applicability of its decisions, the interpretive functions of the World
Court are nowhere nearly as far reaching in impact as action by the Gen-
eral Assembly can be. In order to obtain authoritative interpretation of the
meaning of the Charter that is of universally persuasive quality, not Court
procedures but General Assembly procedures would appear to be much
more rewarding. Since thought is prior to action, persuasion in law is more
effective than compulsion. The growing importance being given to Decla-
rations adopted by the General Assembly as interpretive of the Charter
indicates a shift in the functioning of law in international relations. It is
not the only change that might be used as an example of the rejection of
conceptual jurisprudence, and its substitution by percepts of the actual
way the law functions in its task of reaching the professed goal of effectuat-
ing justice in the lives of human beings everywhere in the world. If the new
structures and institutions that are currently in demand are ever to be
built, sound foundations are indispensable. For these, philosophy no less
than the legal order must be resurveyed and approached with new devices
and inventions, more suitable for sustaining improved ways of living. Out-
dated and unexamined assumptions, presumptions, concepts, analogies,
and theories must be replaced by more acceptable affirmations of the
actualities of life.
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APPENDIX
The call for realism in the law, which is restated here in somewhat
different form, has been presented in previous articles by the same author,
in part, as follows:
1. LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND SANCTION (1937).
2. The Movement for a Neo-Scholastic Philosophy of Law in Amer-
ica, 1932-1942, 18 PRoc. AM. CATH. PHILOS. ASs'N 185 (1942), excerpted in
NATURAL LAW READER 25 (B. Brown ed. 1960) (also sent by Department of
State, Division of International Conferences, to Santiago, for inclusion in
PROCEEDINGS, 10th Chilean Scientific Congress (1944)).
3. Some Implications of the New Code of Canon Law for Legal Phi-
losophy; Supplementary Check-List of Publications of Interest in Neo-
Scholastic Jurisprudence, 19 PRoc. AM. CATH. PHILOS. ASS'N 157 (1943).
4. Law and the Notion of Confrontment, 1 SETON REV. 7 (1952),
reprinted in J. Wu, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JURISPRUDENCE 675 (1958).
5. Natural Law Actualities, 12 CATH. LAW. 141 (1966).
6. Jurisprudence, 8 NEW CATH. ENCYCLOPEDIA 63 (1967); Law, Philos-
ophy of, 8 NEW CATH. ENCYCLOPEDIA 556 (1967).
7. THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS: MAURICE HAURIOU, GEORGES REN-
ARD, JOSEPH T. DELOS 1 & 4 (A. Broderick ed., M. Welling transl. 1970)
(Intro. by M. Rooney).
8. Book Review, 17 AM. J. JURIS. 166 (1972) (review of THE FRENCH
INSTITUTIONALISTS: MAURICE HAURIOU, GEORGES RENARD, JOSEPH T. DELOS
(A. Broderick ed., M. Welling transl. 1970) (Intro. by M. Rooney).
9. Book Review, 5 ARIZ. L. REV. 151 (1963) (review of K. LLEWELLYN,
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962)).
10. International Organization and Internal Law, LEGAL THOUGHT IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES 461 (J.
Hazard and W. Wagner ed. 1970) (VIII International Congress of the Inter-
national Academy of Comparative Law).
11. International Organizations and International Law, 6 INT'L
LAW. 16 (1972) (paper delivered to the VIII International Congress of the
International Academy of Comparative Law, Pescara, Sept. 1, 1970).
12. Justice, Law, and Juridical Decision-Making (proceedings of the
World Congress for Legal and Social Philosophy, Aug. 30-Sept. 3, 1971);
LE RAISONNEMENT JURIDIQUE, LEGAL REASONING, DIE JURIDISCHE
ARGUMENTATION 375-86 (H. Hubien ed. 1971).
13. Law and Power: A Task for Legal Education, paper contributed
to the World Congress of Philosophy XV, Sept. 17-22, 1973, Varna, Bul-
garia (General Subject: Science, Technology, Man-Section D. Research
Group VIII, Philosophy of Law and Philosophy of Politics).

